We investigate the relation between earnings surprises and post-announcement stock returns for 1991-1997, and show that the profit opportunities previously associated with simple trading strategies designed to exploit the drift phenomenon have now been substantially eliminated. This profitability decline does not appear to be due to increased earnings "noise" from transitory items or to structural changes in the serial correlation of earnings surprises.
Introduction
The apparent predictability of stock returns following quarterly earnings announcements remains one of the most significant and perplexing capital market anomalies uncovered to date (Fama 1998) . More than forty (non-independent) studies have documented a "postearnings-announcement drift" in stock returns, or the tendency of share prices to rise (fall) during the nine months after the announcement of large positive (negative) quarterly earnings surprises.
1 Taken at face value, this drift presents a serious challenge to capital market efficiency because it means that pure economic profits (abnormal stock returns) can be earned by trading on publicly available information (quarterly earnings announcements).
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Although it contradicts traditional notions of market efficiency, the post-earningsannouncement drift has become scientifically indisputable (Ball 1992) . The phenomenon has been replicated consistently, and with increasing precision, since its discovery in 1968
by Ball and Brown. Programming errors, chance variation, and potential research design flaws, including a failure to control fully for risk, cannot explain the drift. Nor can it be traced entirely to transaction costs or liquidity and trading-mechanism effects. Indeed, the apparent source of the drift is the failure of share prices to reflect fully what current earnings surprises imply, on average, about earnings surprises in subsequent quarters. 3 Investors underestimate the serial correlation in quarterly earnings surprises by about 50 percent . As a result, when subsequent quarters' earnings are announced, share prices appear to reflect some "surprise" to earnings changes that should have been predictable in advance. Ball (1992) offers a second plausible explanation for the drift anomaly. Rather than being a true market inefficiency traceable to investors' use of earnings information, the drift could instead be due to substantial costs of implementing the trading strategies simulated by researchers. Whatever the cause, Ball (1992) concludes that the drift is likely to be an 1 Reviews include Ball (1978 Ball ( , 1992 , Bernard (1993), and Brown (1997) .
2 Bernard and Thomas (1989, 1990) , for example, examine approximately 85,000 quarterly earnings announcements over [1974] [1975] [1976] [1977] [1978] [1979] [1980] [1981] [1982] [1983] [1984] [1985] [1986] and find that portfolios formed each calendar quarter by taking equal-weighted positions in the top decile of earnings surprises, and short positions in the bottom decile, earn a +8.61 percent average estimated abnormal return over the 250 trading days (approximately twelve months) following the earnings announcement.
enduring feature of the relation between earnings surprises and post-announcement stock returns.
In this paper, we first replicate the drift results in order to calibrate our data collection and analysis procedures. We then investigate the persistence of post-announcement drift during 1991-1997, and show that the profit opportunities previously associated with trading strategies designed to exploit the drift anomaly have now been substantially eliminated. This result is consistent with an "adaptive efficient" stock market (Daniel and Titman 1999) that allows for the existence of profit opportunities in historical data but requires those profit opportunities to dissipate once they become widely apparent to
investors.
Next, we show that our results cannot be attributed just to increased earnings "noise" from transitory items or to structural changes in the serial correlation of earnings surprises.
We find that the serial correlation in quarterly earnings surprises has remained relatively stable over time even though transitory income statement items are more frequent in 1991-1997 than they were in the past. Transitory items introduce noise into the simple trading strategies we investigate, but this noise does not explain our results. Instead, it appears as though investors no longer underestimate the serial correlation in quarterly earnings surprises to the degree documented previously.
Finally, we show that the post-announcement drift persists among small NYSE/AMEX firms, firms with little or no analyst coverage, and firms with low stock prices. These profit opportunities do not appear large enough to exploit.
As a prelude to our analysis, section 2 briefly reviews the evidence on post-earnings announcement drift and identifies when that evidence became widely disseminated. The discussion then turns to consider how public dissemination of the research evidence might plausibly dissipate the profit opportunities from post-announcement drift trading strategies.
The core elements of the argument are straightforward. As investors learn about earnings surprise profit opportunities, they tilt their portfolios toward strategies designed to arbitrage the opportunities, and this alters the behavior of post-earnings-announcement stock returns.
Implementation costs continue to play an important role by limiting the extent of arbitrage.
Section 3 describes the data collection process, measurement issues, and our test procedures.
Section 4 reports our major results concerning the persistence of post-earningsannouncement drift. Concluding remarks are presented in Section 5.
Review of the evidence

The basic phenomenon
In what is perhaps the best known study of post-earnings-announcement drift, document the phenomenon for a sample of approximately 85,000
quarterly earnings announcements by NYSE and AMEX firms over the [1974] [1975] [1976] [1977] [1978] [1979] [1980] [1981] [1982] [1983] [1984] [1985] [1986] period.
Firms are assigned to one of ten portfolios on the basis of their standardized unexpected earnings, or SUE. 4 For a given quarter, a firm's SUE is compared to the distribution of all sample firms' SUEs from the prior quarter to place the firm in a decile portfolio. Abnormal (size-adjusted) daily stock returns for each portfolio are then cumulated beginning the day after the earnings announcement to estimate the post-announcement drift. this post-earnings-announcement price movement is both economically and statistically significant, especially for small and medium-sized firms where the cumulative abnormal returns are about 10 percent over the four quarters. 6 Moreover, for companies of all sizes, the estimated post-announcement abnormal returns are nearly two-thirds as large as the returns that occur during the quarter leading up to and including the earnings announcement.
A second important feature of the drift phenomenon is that about 25 percent of the overall share price movement occurs when the next four quarterly earnings announcements are released. Since earnings surprises tend to include both permanent and temporary components, a portion of the initial earnings surprise (about 40 percent) would typically persist as an earnings surprise one quarter later, with progressively small amounts persisting in the second and third subsequent quarter . 7 Even though investors should be aware that, on average, an earnings surprise in one quarter will be followed by three additional earnings changes in the same direction, the market seems surprised when such a pattern occurs. The market also seems surprised that, on average, there is a partial reversal of the earnings trend in quarter 4, even though this pattern is also to be expected.
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A third feature of the drift phenomenon is its remarkable stability over time. Figure 2 combines the evidence from three prominent studies of post-earnings-announcement drift that disclose returns to a SUE trading strategy on a year-by-year basis. 9 These studies indicate that portfolios with long (short) positions in extreme positive (negative) SUE stocks generated positive estimated abnormal returns in each year from 1965 though 1986. Thus, the drift phenomenon is largely unaffected by changes in macro-economic conditions of the sort that occurred during those years. Nor does seasonality appear to influence the drift.
Over the 50 calendar quarters from 1974-1986, the estimated abnormal returns for a zeroinvestment portfolio of extreme SUE stocks is positive 46 times, and the gains in those quarters exceed the cumulative losses by a factor of 35 to 1 (Bernard and Thomas 1989) .
The profit opportunity associated with a SUE trading strategy thus appears to be significant economically and to be available nearly every quarter.
The drift as an enduring market feature
The demonstrated predictability of stock returns after quarterly earnings announcements is a troubling contradiction to capital market efficiency. The reasoning is as follows: Market efficiency is a simple application of the theory of competition in which there are returns to economic activity. Because investors are presumed to make optimal decisions based on the information available to them, opportunities to earn extraordinary returns arise only from private information. Public information about a company, such as the fact that it has a large earnings surprise, is quickly and accurately incorporated into its share price as investors buy and sell on that information. If stock prices are efficient and correctly incorporate all public 7 This pattern just reflects the serial correlation in earnings surprises.
8 Once again, the share price reactions to subsequent earnings announcements are larger for small and mediumsized firms than for large companies . 9 The methods used vary across the three studies (Latane, Jone, and Rieke 1974; and Bernard and Thomas 1989) , particularly with respect to how SUE portfolios are formed and when trading occurs, so the evidence must be interpreted with some caution. Despite concerns about the feasibility of implementing the simulated trading strategies, the studies provide cross-method validation of the drift anomaly.
information, opportunities to earn extraordinary returns from a SUE trading strategy are precluded.
One efficient markets explanation for the drift anomaly has been to argue that the higher returns available from a SUE trading strategy must be compensation for higher systematic risk (Ball 1978) . Indeed, extreme positive (negative) earnings surprises are accompanied by risk increases (decreases) which persist into the post-announcement period (Ball, Kothari, and Watts 1990) . But these beta shifts are far too small to explain fully the magnitude of the drift . Nor are extreme SUE portfolios risky along any of the five dimensions commonly associated with tests of arbitrage pricing theory .
A second market efficiency argument is that the drift occurs because researchers use a flawed proxy for the market's (unobservable) expected earnings, and thus for the market's earnings surprise. Using a better earnings expectations model (i.e., one that more accurately reflected the earnings forecast embedded in stock price) would presumably mitigate the drift.
Earnings forecasts by security analysts are more accurate than those produced by time-series models. However, the post-announcement drift is actually about 50 percent larger when earnings surprises are measured relative to analysts' forecasts rather than statistical forecasts (Freeman and Tse 1989) . Moreover, professional analysts are also prone to underestimate the serial correlation in quarterly earnings surprises when revising their earnings forecasts for subsequent quarters .
In short, the post-earnings-announcement drift cannot be explained as a byproduct of programming errors, chance variation, or research design flaws such as an inappropriate adjustment for risk or using the wrong model of expected earnings. According to Ball (1992, p. 319) : the magnitude of the post-earnings-announcement drift is daunting in that the return from trading on "old" earnings information exceeds the normal return on the market; the anomaly is ubiquitous in that earnings announcements occur every quarter for every stock; and it is scientifically indisputable because the phenomenon has been replicated, consistently and with increasing precision since its discovery. Ball (1992) offers two plausible explanations for the post-earnings-announcement drift, both of which imply that the anomaly may be a permanent feature of the capital market.
One possibility is that market participants routinely use earnings information inefficiently, leaving unexploited the pure economic profit opportunities documented in Figures 1 and 2 .
Why this occurs is not clear. 10 A second possibility is that it is just not cost efficient for investors who are aware of the post-announcement drift to arbitrage the profit opportunity.
In either case, if the drift is an enduring feature of the capital market, the post-announcement stock return pattern depicted in Figure 1 will persist beyond 1986, the stopping point for Bernard and Thomas (1989, 1990) and many other studies of the drift phenomenon.
An adaptive efficient stock market
Real-world investors, like academics, can learn only imperfectly about pricing anomalies like the post-announcement drift from the past pattern of stock returns, and thus are likely to eliminate the anomalies only after some lag (Daniel and Titman 1999 Journal began publishing a table of earnings surprises, stating that "earnings surprises are perhaps the most important type of new information that can quickly change investor expectations about a stock" (Dorfman 1989 ).
11
That same year, Prudential Securities introduced its quantitative earnings surprise investment model to clients (Mott and Coker 10 For example, the drift may have its roots in the psychology of human information processing behavior and the use of cognitive heuristics like "conservatism" (Edwards 1968) or "anchoring and adjustment" (Kahneman, Slovic, and Tversky 1982) . Indeed, the partial and gradual adjustment to earnings surprises that is observed in share prices and in analysts' earnings forecasts is consistent with a tendency to maintain earnings expectations that are anchored too heavily on the comparable earnings of the prior year. Unfortunately, it is difficult to determine how aggressively our investor should tilt her portfolio toward SUE strategies that performed well in the past.
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On the one hand, our investor is persuaded by the research evidence on post-earnings-announcement drift and calculates that the past profit opportunities from a SUE trading strategy exceed her implementation costs. On the other hand, she is less certain about why the drift occurred in the past, whether it will persist in the future, and whether other knowledgeable investors are also beginning to trade on the anomaly. At the same time our hypothetical investor is discovering the earnings surprise anomaly, other investors are likely to be learning about the post-announcement drift from published research evidence or their own observation of past share price movements. If all informed investors attempt to exploit the post-announcement drift they can push prices to a level where the SUE profit opportunity disappears.
In determining how aggressively to tilt her portfolio toward a SUE trading strategy, our investor would need some theory of inefficient markets that helps explain the extent to which the irrational behavior causing the pricing errors was likely to persist. Our investor would also need to have some idea of the extent to which other rational investors were uncovering 12 Alternatively, our hypothetical investor could also possess the empirical research skills, computational technology, and data required to examine directly the historical pattern of stock returns following quarterly earnings announcements. We presume that this effort would roughly parallel the evolution of research shown in Figure 3 .
13 If the post-announcement excess returns were drawn from a stationary distribution, calculating optimal portfolio weights would be relatively straightforward (Kandel and Stambaugh 1996; Barberis forthcoming 2000) . But stationarity is not likely to be a good assumption in a market that consists of not only uninformed investors but also investors who learn about mispricing from research evidence or their own observations of past prices.
the same pricing anomaly and altering their portfolios to exploit the drift phenomenon. An investor who believes that she is the only one doing this sort of analysis would strongly tilt her portfolio toward the SUE strategy because it has performed well in the past. However, an investor who believes that SUE-related pricing inefficiencies are being corrected by other active investors might choose not to tilt at all toward the historically better SUE strategy.
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The implication is that it is difficult to predict how quickly investor competition will dissipate the post-announcement drift profit opportunity once it becomes widely apparent to investors. Implementation costs and other limits to arbitrage (Shliefer and Vishny 1997;
Lesmond 2000) also make it difficult to predict the extent to which the drift anomaly will be eliminated by investor competition. The dashed line in Figure 1 illustrates one possibility.
Here, the drift is smaller in magnitude and concentrated in just a few trading days immediately after the initial earnings announcement. Both features are consistent with investor learning and arbitrage costs. Complete elimination of the drift would result in postannouncement abnormal stock returns indistinguishable from zero.
Reconciliation
Our empirical predictions are intended to establish boundary conditions for interpreting possible results. As such, our predictions are derived from three different (but not mutually exclusive) explanations for the post-earnings-announcement drift. One explanation is that market participants just use earnings information inefficiently, perhaps because the cognitive heuristics they employ are prone to systematic error. A second explanation is that arbitrage costs (defined broadly to include information acquisition and implementation costs) exceed the expected returns to SUE trading strategies as simulated by researchers. According to Ball (1992) , both factors-inefficient use of earnings information and costly implementation of simulated SUE trading strategies-are likely to be permanent features of the capital market. Our third explanation for the drift relies on the notion of an "adaptive efficient" market where pricing anomalies can be observed in historical data but are reduced or eliminated once they become apparent to investors.
If the post-announcement drift is an enduring market inefficiency, stock returns will continue to exhibit the pattern documented by Bernard and Thomas (1989, 1990 ) and illustrated by the solid line in Figure 1 . Returns for a hedged portfolio of extreme earnings 14 Ironically, if the informed investors believe that the market is efficient, they will not exploit the strategies and the price anomaly will persist. Alternatively, if the informed investors underestimate the number and aggressiveness of other informed investors, they may, as a group, tilt too much toward the strategies, and the anomaly will reverse.
surprises will increase about 8.6 percent over the 250 days following the initial earnings announcement, and a substantial portion of that increase will occur at the time of subsequent quarterly earnings announcements. Moreover, the magnitude of the post-announcement drift will be larger for small and medium-sized firms than for large firms.
On the other hand, if investors do indeed learn from published research, the magnitude and duration of the post-announcement drift in stock returns will now be substantially diminished (as illustrated by the dashed line in Figure 1 ) or perhaps eliminated. Investor learning seems quite plausible in this setting, especially when the chronology of published research ( Figure 3 ) is considered.
Data and Estimation Procedures
Our sample selection, measurement and estimation procedures follow those described in Bernard and Thomas (1989, 1990) . We require that the firm be listed on the CRSP daily files, and that the firm's earnings before extraordinary items and discontinued operations be available for at least ten consecutive quarters on the Compustat Primary, Supplementary or Tertiary Industrial files. Compustat is also the source for earnings announcement dates.
Observations were excluded from the analysis if the return for the earnings announcement day was missing on CRSP, or if the CSRP returns series did not encompass the 160 trading days surrounding the earnings announcement. Our sample includes 97,040 firm-quarters of data for 2,981 NYSE/AMEX firms for 1974-1986, the period examined in Bernard and Thomas (1989, 1990) , and 51,539 firm-quarters of data for 2,928 NYSE/AMEX firms in 1991-1997. 15,16 Our tests for the persistence of post-announcement drift focus on the 1991-1997 sample period, the most recent years for which complete data are available. We do not include the period from 1987 though 1991 because we cannot predict how quickly investors will learn 15 Our replication sample period ends with the third calendar quarter of 1986 to conform to Bernard and Thomas (1989,1990) . Our second sample period ends with the third calendar quarter of 1997 because the postannouncement stock return data needed for the analysis was not available from CRSP at the time the research was conducted. Bernard and Thomas (1989, 1990) identified NYSE/AMEX firms based on exchange listing data in the annual Compustat files for 1982 through 1987. We include only firms identified by CRSP as trading on one of the two stock exchanges at the earnings announcement date. Our replication sample contains 14.4 percent more firm-quarter observations than the Bernard and Thomas (1989, 1990) sample. 16 Our sample represents 64.4 percent and 32.5 percent of all quarterly earnings announcements available from Compustat for 1974-1986 and 1991-1997, respectively . Announcements were dropped because either the earnings data available from Compustat was insufficient for model estimation purposes (8.6 percent and 17.0 percent), or because the firm was not trading on the NYSE or AMEX exchange at the announcement (27.0 percent and 50.5 percent). The noticeable decline in sample representation over time is due to increased Compustat coverage of NASDAQ firms.
about the drift anomaly or, once they are aware of the drift, how quickly they will implement strategies to arbitrage the SUE profit opportunity. Both 1989 and 1990 appear to have been pivotal years in the evolution of the post-announcement drift literature and in the ease with which earnings surprise trading strategies could be implemented using Wall Street Journal tabulations or brokerage firm client research reports.
Estimation of abnormal returns
Size-adjusted daily abnormal returns are calculated as follows:
where AR it and R it denote the abnormal and raw common stock return for company i and day t, and R size t , is the value-weighted return on day t for the CRSP NYSE/AMEX market capitalization decile portfolio that firm i is a member of at the beginning of the calendar year. Abnormal returns are summed over time to obtain cumulative abnormal returns (CARs). Three-day (-2 to 0) cumulative abnormal returns are formed to isolate the stock price reaction to quarterly earnings announcements, where day 0 is the Compustat earnings announcement date. 17 Abnormal daily returns are also summed over a roughly sixty-day period (i.e., from day +1 to day -3 of the next quarter) to capture any post-announcement drift that occurs between quarterly earnings announcement dates.
Although our use of CAR as a return metric is consistent with Bernard and Thomas (1989, 1990) , this approach implicitly assumes daily portfolio rebalancing and leads to an upward bias in the returns cumulated over long time periods. Buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHARs) capture investor experience more accurately, but produce less reliable test statistics (Barber and Lyon, 1996; Kothari and Warner, 1997; Fama, 1998) . Consequently, we also report BHAR results when drawing inferences about investor behavior.
Estimation of standardized unexpected earnings (SUE)
Standardized unexpected earnings (SUE) is defined as the change in earnings (before extraordinary items and discontinued operations) relative to the equivalent quarter last year, detrended and scaled by the standard deviation of SUE over the trend estimation period:
where ( ) E Q it is the expectation for quarterly earnings at time t for firm i, Q i t , −4 is reported quarterly earnings (before extraordinary items) for the same quarter one year earlier, δ it is a trend term calculated as the historical average seasonal change in quarterly earnings, and σ it is the standard deviation of SUE it over the trend estimation period. 18 This measure of earnings surprise ignores the serial correlation in seasonally differenced quarterly earnings. 19 We retain SUE as our earnings surprise measure because of its importance to earlier studies, but we also investigate the degree to which changes in the post-announcement drift are attributable to misspecification of the quarterly earnings expectations model.
Portfolio assignment
Each quarterly earnings announcement is assigned to an "earnings surprise" decile based on its SUE ranking in the sample distribution of all announcements for the prior quarter.
Announcements with the lowest SUE values are assigned to earnings surprise decile 1, and those with highest SUE values are assigned to decile 10. Hedged portfolio returns are formed by taking an equally weighted long position in the portfolio of stocks assigned to SUE decile 10 (extreme positive earnings surprise firms) and a short position in stocks assigned to SUE decile 1 (extreme negative earnings surprise firms). 
Empirical Results
We first replicate prior results in our sample. We then show that the post-announcement drift has become less pronounced in recent years. Next, we consider whether this result can be explained by transitory earnings components that may contaminate our SUE portfolio 18 A maximum of 36 quarterly earnings observations were used to estimate the trend and scaling parameters of SUE for each earnings announcement. As in Bernard and Thomas (1989) , earnings announcements were included in the sample even if only ten consecutive quarters of data were available. In cases where fewer than 16 observations were available, quarterly earnings are assumed to follow a seasonal random walk.
19 See Bernard and Thomas (1989, 1990) and . 20 We did not implement the zero-investment "continuously balanced SUE strategy" of Bernard and Thomas (1989, pp. 8-9) which requires that offsetting long and short positions are available on a given earnings announcement day. Instead, our long (short) positions are equally weighted across the available pool of good (bad) news firms, with the total amount of the long position exactly offsetting the total amount of the short position each quarter. Our strategy is easier to implement, but also more costly for the investor since offsetting long and short positions are not required at the time trading occurs. assignment, or by possible changes in the serial correlation of earnings surprises. Finally, we show that analysts following and trading costs partially explain the small but persistent post-announcement drift that continues through 1997. Table 1 verifies that prior results hold in our sample for the 1974-1986 period. Panel A reports the market reactions to future earnings announcements for high (decile 10) and low (decile 1) earnings surprise portfolios, and for a hedged portfolio that is long in SUE decile 10 and short in SUE decile 1. Our results (panel A.2) closely replicate those reported by Results from Table 2 and Figure 4 show that post-earnings-announcement drift has declined since 1990. This result is consistent for portfolios formed across all firms as well as for portfolios formed with size categorizations. Next we turn our attention to whether this decline in returns can be attributed to changes in SUE metric.
Replication of the Bernard & Thomas results
Post-announcement drift after 1990
22 Each plot in Figure 1 is constructed using eight segments. For example, the cumulative hedged portfolio return for quarter t+1 consists of two segments. The first segment measures the buy-and-hold abnormal return beginning one day after the current quarter earnings announcement though three days prior to the next quarterly earnings announcement. The second segment measures the three-day earnings announcement buy-and-hold return for quarter t+1. Returns for each segment are compounded to form the cumulative return. The remaining segments for each plot are constructed in a similar manner. Again, the results presented by size represent the application of the trading strategy within a given size category. Unlike the results presented in Tables 1 and 2 , the cumulative BHARs in Firgure 4 do not assume that the long and short positions are reversed after quarter t+3.
23 Currently we do not know whether the BHAR for quarter t+1 is concentrated early in the quarter. Evidence on this issue will be presented in the next draft of the paper. It is plausible that the return is concentrated in the first few days following the earnings announcement because our simulated trading strategy involves taking a position at the closing price on day 0, the Wall Street Journal publication date, of quarter t. Consequently, any price reaction following day 0 would be assigned to the post announcement period and show up in the return for quarter t+1.
Special item contamination
Special items represent non-recurring components of income as defined by Compustat.
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Special items include, but are not limited to, nonrecurring items such as current year results of discontinued operations, natural disasters, repurchase of debentures, and the profit or loss on sale of assets, investments and securities. Prior research has documented an increase in the relative frequency and magnitude of special items over time and that special items are less value relevant than more persistent components of income (Elliot and Hannah 1996; Collins, Maydew and Weiss 1997) . 25 Furthermore, income decreasing special items are more prevalent than income increasing special items (Elliot and Hannah 1996) .
Burghstahler, Jiambalvo and Shevlin (1999) report a dramatic increase in the number of firm observations with non-zero special items reported in Compustat starting in 1982. This suggests a reporting bias exists with respect to special item coverage by Compustat for the period 1974-1986 and 1991-1997. 26 The SUE metric employed in this paper and by Bernard and Thomas (1989, 1990 ) is based upon earnings before extraordinary items and discontinued operations. This income measure includes the effects of special items. The inclusion of special items in the income figure used to calculate SUE could result in misclassification error with respect to SUE decile assignment. Specifically, firms with positive special items (non-recurring gains)
could be mistakenly classified as high SUE firms. Similarly, firms with negative special items (non-recurring losses) may be erroneously coded as low SUE firms. If these classification errors have become more prevalent since 1990, the markets' natural tendency to discount special items could partially explain the observed decrease in abnormal returns to the SUE trading strategy.
To investigate this possibility, we estimate the following two pooled cross-sectional regression equations: The scaled SUE variables are constructed by first placing SUEs in deciles based upon the previous quarter's earnings surprise distribution. The resulting decile rankings (1 to 10) are then scaled to range between -0.5 and 0.5. 28 Given the way we have constructed the regressions, the coefficients can be interpreted as abnormal returns to zero-investment (hedged) portfolios. Note that a coefficient from a regression of abnormal returns can always be interpreted as the abnormal return on a portfolio with a value of 1 for the associated regressor, and a value of 0 for the remaining regressors. Thus, the estimated coefficient β 1 from equation (4) represents the abnormal return on a zero-investment portfolio for 1974-1986 with a long (short) position in the highest (lowest) SUE decile stocks. 29 Similarly, β 1 + β 3 from equation (4) represents the abnormal return from the simulated trading strategy for 1991-1997. 27 The notation used in equation (5) implies coefficient restrictions that were not imposed by the estimation procedure. For example, the first term on the RHS of equation (5) was estimated as: β 0 + β 1 SUE t + β* 0 D SI + β* 1 (D SI x SUE t ). 28 This scaling procedure further results in the theoretical value of all intercept terms being zero. Consequently, discussion of the intercept terms will be omitted unless statistically different from zero. 29 The results presented in Tables 1 and 2 , as well as Figure 4 are based upon hedged portfolios formed by calendar quarter. Equations (4) and (5) implicitly form a single hedged portfolio based upon all observations. This difference will cause the results reported from equations (4) and (5) to not articulate to the aforementioned results.
Equation (4) provides benchmark results for the investigation of the effect of special items. Equation (5) isolates the impact of special item contamination on abnormal returns.
Specifically, the estimated coefficient β 1 from equation (5) represents the hedged portfolio abnormal return for 1974-1986 in the absence of special item contamination. Similiarly, β 1 + β 3 from equation (5) represents the hedged portfolio abnormal return for 1991-1997 in the absence of special item contamination. Finally, β 1 + β 3 + β 3 γ 2 (β 1 + β 1 γ 1 ) represents the abnormal return for 1991-1997 (1974-1986) for firms where SUE is contaminated by special items.
Panel A of Table 3 presents results from the baseline regression of equation (4) however, this result must be interpreted with caution because prior evidence documents a potential bias in Compustat coverage regarding special items.
Evidence from Table3 indicates a decrease in the post-earnings-announcement drift since 1990 after controlling for special item contamination. This result holds for portfolios formed across all firms as well as portfolios formed within large and small firms.
Furthermore, the results indicate a downward bias in the BHAR due to the contaminating effects of special items upon SUE.
Earnings persistence
Prior empirical research documents a positive relation between abnormal returns and the persistence of earnings (Kormendi and Lipe 1987; Collins and Kothari 1989) . A second potential explanation for the diminished post-earnings-announcement drift subsequent to 1990 is that earnings surprises have become less persistent since 1990 than was the case from [1974] [1975] [1976] [1977] [1978] [1979] [1980] [1981] [1982] [1983] [1984] [1985] [1986] . A decrease in the persistence of earnings surprises could be due to heightened competition in product and factor markets, changes in investment and operating decisions, or changes in accounting regulations or the application of accounting principles.
Conceptually, a reduction in the persistence of earnings surprises could result in those surprises being less informative about future surprises and hence be associated with diminished post-earnings-announcement drift.
To investigate changes in the persistence of earnings surprises, we examine the serial correlation in quarterly earnings surprise using the following pooled regression:
where SUE t is the forecast error in quarter t from a seasonal random walk model with trend, pattern. Furthermore, the magnitude of the coefficients is nearly identical to those reported in and -1986 , the coefficients from the regression on all firms imply a $1 earnings surprise in quarter t translates into Evidence from Table 4 documents a decline in the persistence of earnings surprises for quarter t+1, a modest increase in the persistence of earnings surprises for quarter t+3 and an increased reversal for quarter t+4. This evidence suggests that a decrease in the persistence of earnings surprises is at least partially responsible for the diminished BHAR associated with the SUE trading strategy. Evidence on the persistence of earnings surprises for large firms indicates the decreased persistence of earnings surprises is not large enough to fully account for the diminishment of the BHAR. Thus, the decrease in the persistence of earnings surprises appears to explain some, but not all, of the decrease in the BHAR drift.
Analyst coverage and arbitrage costs
The simulated SUE trading strategy entails substantial investor expertise and resources.
Investors who are aware of the post-earnings-announcement drift and seek to profit from the SUE trading strategy would need to (1) maintain a database of quarterly earnings forecasts and historical SUEs, (2) monitor corporate press releases on a daily basis for quarterly earnings announcements, (3) scrutinize those announcements for non-recurring special items that might contaminate SUE decile classification, and (4) estimate the expected profit from trading on the SUE information. 31 Once the decision to trade has been made, these investor 30 The earnings figure employed in the calculation of SUE used in the serial correlation analysis is not purged of special items. It is plausible that an increase in the frequency of reported special items could induce the pattern of changes in serial correlation for 1991-1997. This issue will be addressed in a subsequent version of this paper. 31 To estimate the expected profit from the SUE trading strategy, investors would need to consider structural changes in the serial correlation of earnings surprises (including the impact of special items, mandatory changes in accounting policies, and so on) and the degree to which other investors were also trading on the SUE strategy.
would then need to assemble and rebalance a portfolio of offsetting long and short positions in hundreds of individual securities.
The arbitrage costs associated with the SUE trading strategy (i.e., the costs incurred in deciding to trade and in executing the trade) are nontrivial. These costs limit how much of the post-earnings-announcement drift abnormal return can be profitably captured by following the SUE trading strategy. 32 In the presence of arbitrage costs, knowledgeable investors will trade only if the anticipated SUE trading profits exceeds the cost of arbitrage.
Of course, uninformed traders will continue to trade SUE securities for other exogenous reasons.
Profit maximizing investors seeking to capitalize on the SUE trading strategy would focus their attention on trading opportunities that offered the greatest net reward. For example, although small firms have a larger post-announcement abnormal return than do medium or large firms, SUE-related arbitrage costs may also be higher for small firms.
Investors may face higher information acquisition costs, liquidity costs, or margin requirements. The presence of significant arbitrage costs implies the post-1990 drift should dissipate the most where arbitrage costs are low. Conversely, the drift should show less dissipation where arbitrage costs are high.
We investigate the impact of arbitrage costs on drift dissipation in two ways. First, we estimate the following pooled regression:
where indicator variable D AF takes on a value of one when there are four or more Zacks analysts following the company and all other variables are as previously defined.
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Thus, the estimated coefficient β 1 from equation (7) represents the abnormal return on a zero-investment portfolio for 1974-1986 with a long (short) position in highest (lowest) 32 Bernard and Thomas (1989) estimate the transaction costs of the SUE trading strategy to be about 3 percent for large firms and 6 percent for small firms each quarter. Lesmond (2000) derives firm specific transaction cost estimates for extreme earnings surprise portfolios by firm size, of 14.3 percent for small firms, 6.5 percent for medium size firms, and 3.7 percent for large firms over the period 1974-1993. 33 Analyst data from Zacks Investment Research begins in 1988. Consequently, no data is analyst coverage data is available for [1974] [1975] [1976] [1977] [1978] [1979] [1980] [1981] [1982] [1983] [1984] [1985] [1986] . Equation (7) therefore embeds the interaction of coverage with the 1991-1997 period only.
SUE decile stocks. 34 Similarly, β 1 + β 3 represents the abnormal return from the simulated trading strategy for 1991-1997 for firms not covered by four or more analysts. Finally, β 1 + β 3 + β 3 γ represents the abnormal return for 1991-1997 for firms covered by four or more analysts.
Analyst coverage from Zacks Investor Research is used as a proxy for reduced arbitrage costs for three reasons. First, analyst coverage results in more visible earnings announcements thus reducing investors' information acquisition costs. Second, analysts are likely to examine earnings releases for non-recurring transactions and evaluate their financial statement impact. Third, analysts tend not to cover illiquid stocks. Increased liquidity results in lower trade execution costs.
Our second approach to arbitrage costs involves imposing a $5.00 minimum stock price constraint on the sample. This price screen proxies for lower trade execution costs due to the bid-ask spread and margin account requirements. We thus re-estimate equation (7) on a reduced sample of stocks where share price is greater than $5.00. Evidence from Table 5 shows the decrease in post-announcement drift is concentrated in firms covered by analysts. This result is consistent across medium and large firms. Furthermore, for large firms covered by analysts the drift abnormal return is not statistically different from zero. This evidence is consistent with investors implementing SUE trading strategies to capture the post-announcement drift where the implementation costs are lowest. Additionally, the evidence shows the drift abnormal returns persist where the implementation costs are greatest.
Conclusions
This paper examines the persistence of the post-announcement drift during 1991-1997.
We find that the abnormal returns previously associated with the earnings surprise trading strategy have now declined substantially. The reduced profitability of the trading strategy occurs among small, medium and large firms. It does not appear to be due solely to changes in the serial correlation of earnings surprises or to the contaminating effects of special items (known to be more prevalent in the late 1990s). The drift reduction is especially pronounced among medium and large firms with analyst following. Specifically, the abnormal returns to the earnings surprise trading strategy has been completely eliminated for large firms with analyst following. The evidence suggests that investors have implemented cost-effective trading strategies to capture the post-announcement abnormal returns after learning about the drift anomaly from academic research.
We are currently extending the study in two directions. The first extension incorporates I/B/E/S consensus earnings forecasts as an alternative measure of earnings surprise. One possible explanation for the diminished profitability of the traditional SUE trading strategy is that (1) investors trade on analysts' earnings surprises not on SUE, and (2) SUE has become a less reliable proxy for analysts' EPS surprises. The I/B/E/S data will also be used to test for diminished profitability of analysts' earnings surprises as a trading strategy. Our second extension expands the sample beyond NYSE/AMEX firms to NASDAQ firms.
This paper has two main implications for future empirical research. First, results from this paper suggest future empirical work should examine anomalies in cases where reduced implementation costs and investor learning are likely. Technological advancements, more readily available data, and decreasing trade execution costs reduce the arbitrage costs of 22 simple trading strategies. Heightened awareness of academic research on seemingly profitable trading creates an environment conducive to investor learning. The evidence here suggests that the previously documented profitability of these trading strategies is also likely to have diminished over time.
Second, our results strike a cautionary note about the use of "stale" market data for research purposes. The caution is that equilibrium stock prices today may no longer reflect the phenomenon documented in historical prices, particularly when that phenomenon involves a substantial profit opportunity that can be readily exploited with a simple trading strategy. Source of data: Bernard and Thomas 1990, Table 2 ). Portfolio CAR is the percentage cumulative abnormal return over holding periods beginning after the earnings announcement day for quarter Q 0 , for a portfolio invested long (short) in the highest (lowest) decile of standardized unexpected earnings (SUE) that quarter. Earnings announcements are assigned to deciles based on the standing of SUE relative to the prior quarter SUE distribution. SUE represents forecast errors from the Foster 1977) first-order autoregressive earnings expectation model (in seasonal differences) scaled by their estimation-period standard deviation. Size adjusted returns are the sums over the post-announcement holding periods of the difference between daily returns and returns for all NYSE and AMEX firms of the same size decile, based on January 1 market values of equity. Holding periods are obtained by splitting the period between adjacent quarterly earnings announcement dates into a three-day pre-announcement window (day -2 to day 0) and an inter-announcement window. While the actual inter-announcement windows vary in length, the man value of 60 trading days is used to illustrate the differential price responses occurring in the two windows.
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Figure 2. Annual Returns to the Earnings Surprise (SUE) Trading Strategy by Year, 1965-1986, as Reported in Three Prominent Studies
Source of data . Long (short) positions in stocks with SUE greater than (less than) 1.5 are taken two months after the end of the fiscal quarter, and held for six months. Returns are not adjusted for risk. Returns shown above are calculated first by annualizing six-month returns taken each of the four quarters. Annualized returns from each quarter are then summed to arrive at the calendar year portfolio return. The return for 1971 is based on the sum of only two six-month positions. . Long (short) positions are taken in 20 stocks with the highest (lowest) SUEs among a universe that grows from 170 to 972 stocks. The universe includes only stocks announcing earnings within one month of the fiscal quarter close. Market-neutral positions are taken at the beginning of the next month and held for three months. Returns from four three-month holding periods are summed to arrive at the calendar year portfolio return. Bernard and Thomas (1989) . Long (short) positions are taken in stocks among the top (bottom) quintile of SUE, relative to the prior quarter SUE distribution. Each $1 long position is always offset by a $1 short positions in stock(s) of similar size. Returns are not adjusted for risk. Returns are reported for calendar quarters and summed to arrive at the annual return. The return for 1986 is based on only nine months. Adapted from Bernard (1993) . 
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Return ) 1972 -1979 Bernard & Thomas (1989 -1986 ) 1965 -1971 To be included in this compilation, the published article had to report new evidence on the relation between earnings quarterly earnings surprises and post-announcement stock returns, the post-announcement period had to span at least 60 trading days. Survey articles and studies investigating earnings announcement stock returns over a narrow trading window (less than 60 days) were excluded. The number of articles appearing in journals included in the compilation are: Accounting Review (4) -1986 ) replication period, and in 1991 -1997 . The hedge portfolio takes a long position in the highest decile SUE stocks and a corresponding short position in the lowest decile SUE stocks. Small, medium, and large firms are in size deciles 1 to 4, 5 to 7, and 8 to 10, respectively, based on January 1 market value of equity for all NYSE and AMEX firms. Percentage abnormal return in quarter t + k for earnings surprise portfolios formed in quarter t Table 1 concluded.
Cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) are sums over specified holding periods of the difference between daily returns and returns for NYSE-AMEX firms of the same size decile. Standardized unexpected earnings (SUE) represent forecast errors from a seasonal random walk with drift earnings expectation model, scaled by their estimation-period standard deviation. Portfolios are formed by grouping earnings announcements into deciles based on the distribution of SUE for the previous calendar quarter. The hedged portfolio involves a zero investment long position in stocks with extreme positive earnings surprises (SUE decile 10) and an offsetting short position in stocks with extreme negative earnings surprises (SUE decile 1). Following Bernard and Thomas (19900) , long and short portfolio positions are reversed after quarter t+3 in panels A and B. Small, medium, and large firms are in size deciles 1 to 4, 5 to 7, and 8 to 10, respectively, based on January 1 market value of equity for all NYSE and AMEX firms. Day 0 is the quarterly earnings announcement date. A * denotes statistical significance at the 0.01 level, two-tailed tests. Bernard and Thomas (1989,1990) do not report test results for all summary statistics in their tables. Cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) are sums over specified holding periods of the difference between daily returns and returns for NYSE-AMEX firms of the same size decile. Standardized unexpected earnings (SUE) represent forecast errors from a seasonal random walk with drift earnings expectation model, scaled by their estimation-period standard deviation. Portfolios are formed by grouping earnings announcements into deciles based on the distribution of SUE for the previous calendar quarter. The hedged portfolio involves a zero investment long position in stocks with extreme positive earnings surprises (SUE decile 10) and an offsetting short position in stocks with extreme negative earnings surprises (SUE decile 1). Following Bernard and Thomas (19900) , long and short portfolio positions are reversed after quarter t+3 in panels A and B. Small, medium, and large firms are in size deciles 1 to 4, 5 to 7, and 8 to 10, respectively, based on January 1 market value of equity for all NYSE and AMEX firms. Day 0 is the quarterly earnings announcement date. A * denotes statistical significance at the 0.01 level, two-tailed tests. To maintain comparability with Bernard and Thomas (1989,1990) and Table  1 , we do not report significance levels for all summary statistics in the BHAR t+4 is the cumulative hedge portfolio abnormal return over the period beginning one day after the announcement of earnings for quarter t through the day of the announcement for quarter t+4. SUE t is the scaled decile rank earnings surprise for quarter t, based on the forecast error for a seasonal random walk model with drift. The hedge portfolio takes a long position in the highest decile SUE stocks and a corresponding short position in the lowest decile SUE stocks. The indicator variable D T takes on a value of one for 1991 though 1997 and zero otherwise. The indicator variable D SI takes on a value of one when quarterly earnings for the highest (lowest) decile SUE stocks is contaminated by a positive (negative) special item, and zero elsewhere. Small, medium, and large firms are in size deciles 1 to 4, 5 to 7, and 8 to 10, respectively, based on January 1 market value of equity for all NYSE and AMEX firms. , SUE t is the forecast error in quarter t from a seasonal random walk model with trend, scaled by its estimation-period standard deviation. The values of all SUE variables are constrained to fall between ± 5.00 to reduce the impact of extreme observations. The indicator variable D T takes on a value of one for 1991 though 1997 and zero otherwise. Small, medium, and large firms are in size deciles 1 to 4, 5 to 7, and 8 to 10, respectively, based on January 1 market value of equity for all NYSE and AMEX firms. A * denotes statistical significance at the 0.01 level, two-tailed test. 
